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ACCESSORY LIABILITY AND COMMON UNLAWFUL PURPOSES 
 
 
THE common law governing so-called “joint enterprises” has been under stress in recent years. On 
occasion, juries have been unduly willing to find the existence of a shared criminal purpose between 
wrongdoers and their friends, and to find foresight by those friends of what the wrongdoers might do. 
A perception of injustice can only be compounded by the constructive nature of homicide crimes. 
Those who neither kill, nor foresee any risk that their colleague may kill, might yet be eligible for a 
conviction running even to murder. Many have therefore welcomed a ruling that joint enterprise 
liability is no more, at least in England and Wales. In Jogee and Ruddock,
1
 the Supreme Court joined 
with the Privy Council to abolish it. Yet the High Court of Australia demurred when invited in Miller 
to do the same.
2
 So the law of joint enterprise is no longer common. 
 Of course, divergence between two of the common law’s most senior courts is hardly 
unknown, even on fundamental criminal-law questions. The High Court famously went its own way 
in the wake of DPP v Smith,
3
 when their Lordships adopted an objective test of intention. Neither did 
it endorse Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Caldwell,
4
 when the House of Lords redefined 
recklessness. Strikingly, however, those are decisions that the English courts came to disavow. Over 
time, London became realigned with Canberra. Should we hope the same will happen again?  
 
 
I. TWO INTERCONNECTED QUESTIONS 
 
In order to understand the latest divide between our jurisdictions, we need to specify more precisely 
what the Supreme Court did in Jogee. Most prominently, the Court abolished what in Australia is 
called the doctrine of extended joint criminal enterprise,
5
 sometimes known in England as “parasitic 
accessorial liability”.6 According to that doctrine, where S, the secondary party, and P, the perpetrator, 
form a common unlawful purpose to commit a crime (crime A), and set out together to pursue it, then 
in addition to any liability S may have regarding crime A, S becomes liable as a party to any further 
crime (crime B) committed by P in the pursuance of crime A, provided S realises that a crime of that 
further type is a possible upshot of their carrying out the common purpose.
7
 Extended joint criminal 
enterprise liability therefore supplies a distinct channel of complicity liability, separate from aiding 
and abetting because it does not require the prosecution to prove specifically that S has assisted or 
encouraged crime B.
8
 Indeed, as the House of Lords recognised in Powell, it operates to sustain 
                                                     
1
 Jogee [2016] UKSC 8; Ruddock [2016] UKPC 7; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681. For convenience, the joint appeal will 
be referred to here as Jogee. 
2
 Miller v The Queen; Smith v The Queen; Presley v DPP for South Australia [2016] HCA 30. (Hereafter cited 
as Miller.) 
3
 [1961] A.C. 290; [1960] 3 All E.R. 161 (HL); rejected in Parker v The Queen [1963] HCA 14; (1963) 111 
C.L.R. 610 (reversed on other grounds (1964) 111 C.L.R. 665). In Parker, the High Court preferred its own 
precedents, notably Smyth [1957] HCA 24; (1957) 98 C.L.R. 163, with Dixon CJ describing the House of Lords 
decision as “misconceived and wrong”. For the first time, House of Lords decisions were disavowed as binding 
upon Australian law: see, especially, at 632. 
4
 [1982] A.C. 341; [1981] 1 All E.R. 961 (HL). The decision was largely ignored by the High Court of 
Australia, which like many jurisdictions continued to prefer a subjective test: see, e.g., Crabbe [1985] HCA 22; 
(1985) 156 C.L.R. 464 and Royall v The Queen [1991] HCA 27; (1991) 172 C.L.R. 378. 
5
 See, e.g, Miller, at [3]–[5]. The Australian terminology is perspicacious notwithstanding the worries noted in 
Jogee, at [77], to which the High Court in Miller responded at [45]. 
6
 Gnango [2011] UKSC 59; [2012] 1 A.C. 827 at [42]–[43] (Lords Rodger and Brown, Lord Wilson 
concurring), [94]–[96] (Lord Dyson). The phrase was coined by J.C. Smith, “Criminal Liability of Accessories: 
Law and Law Reform” (1997) 113 L.Q.R. 453. 
7
 As is noted in Miller (at [43]–[44]), crime B must be foreseen by S as a real rather than fanciful possibility, but 
need not be seen as probable. For an explanation of the English law prior to Jogee, and discussion of some of 
the associated problems, see A.P. Simester et al, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law 5th edn (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2013) § 7.5 (hereafter Simester and Sullivan 5edn). 
8
 Notice that this is primarily an actus reus distinction, albeit one accompanied by mens rea differences: 
Simester and Sullivan 5edn, §§ 7.5, 7.5(v)(a). We return to this important point below.  
2 
 
liability even where S has actively discouraged P from committing crime B, but proceeded 
nonetheless with the plan to commit Crime A.
9
  
 That boat has now sailed from English shores. No longer can S become guilty of foreseen 
ancillary crimes by pursuing a shared criminal purpose with P. S must be a party directly to any crime 
of which S is convicted. Extended joint criminal enterprise liability is thus interred, at least for now. 
 So much is well known. What may be less obvious is that the doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise itself—of “plain vanilla” joint enterprises,10 as Lord Hoffman once called them—is also 
abolished. Suppose that S and P decide to attack V. They find and confront V, who is punched by P. 
Prior to Jogee, S could be convicted of battery just in virtue of the fact that S had a common purpose 
with P that the battery be committed. No more. From the perspective of complicity liability, a 
common unlawful purpose is no longer doctrinally significant (although it may still have evidential 
significance). What must now be shown, under English law, is that S aided, abetted, counselled, or 
procured P’s crime. Of course, the practical effects of this second difference are small. Doubtless, S 
can still be convicted of battery, since it will usually be straightforward to prove that one who joins in 
a common purpose thereby encourages the perpetrator. (More on this below.) But this is now a matter 
to be proved in its own right. In terms of formal doctrine, it is the encouragement, not the shared 
purpose, that must now be shown.
11
   
 Understandably, given its limited practical implications, the Supreme Court did not explicate 
this aspect of its decision. But it emerges as an implication of the Court’s more general approach to 
complicity liability. The core idea that underpins Jogee is that all forms of complicity liability must be 
channelled through the “aid, abet, counsel, or procure” formula12—in essence, through assistance or 
encouragement.
13
 There is no other actus reus channel via which secondary liability can pass. The 
Supreme Court did not merely reject the idea that parasitic accessory liability is part of the common 
law. It went for a much bigger fish: that common purpose does not exist as a legal category at all. In 
practice, the implications are twofold: that S can only participate in P’s crime if S is shown to have 
actually assisted or encouraged the commission of that crime. More precisely, S must assist or 
encourage P’s actual crime (the actus reus), with intent (the mens rea) to assist either a crime of that 
type
14
 or one of a set of crimes including the crime actually committed.
15
 
 And that’s not all. In presenting Jogee as a reassertion of the fundamental common-law 
principles of complicity, the third major contribution of the Supreme Court was to restate the 
traditional mens rea requirements for aiding and abetting, which it articulated in terms of knowledge 
and intention. Citing classic cases such as National Coal Board v Gamble
16
 and Johnson v Youden,
17
 
Jogee implicitly—oddly, not explicitly—overrules a line of Court of Appeal decisions, going back at 
least to Rook,
18
 in which foresight of P’s possible actions falling short of knowledge was said to 
suffice for S’s liability. 
 This last move is, as we shall see, a crucial development in light of the Court’s abolition of 
joint criminal enterprise liability. For many common-law jurisdictions, a dual-channel approach to 
                                                     
9
 Powell; English [1999] 1 A.C. 1 at 11 (Lord Mustill), 20 (Lord Hutton); [1997] 4 All E.R. 545 at 548, 556-
557. 
10
 Brown and Isaac v The State [2003] UKPC 10 at [13]. 
11
 See Jogee, at [78]; cf. also at [66]: “There can be no doubt that if [S] continues to participate in crime A with 
foresight that [P] may commit crime B, that is evidence, and sometimes powerful evidence, of an intent to assist 
[P] in crime B. But it is evidence of such intent…, not conclusive of it.” 
12
 Cf. s. 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, as amended by s. 65(7) of the Criminal Law Act 1977. 
13
 Jogee, at [89]. The Court did not consider the possibility that procurement may involve some other form of 
contribution, but that point is incidental here.  
14
 Cf. Bainbridge [1960] 1 Q.B. 129; [1959] 3 All E.R. 200. 
15
 Cf. DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1350; [1978] 3 All E.R. 1140. 
16
 [1959] 1 Q.B. 11; [1958] 3 All E.R. 203. 
17
 [1950] 1 K.B. 544; [1950] 1 All E.R. 300. 
18
 [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1005; [1993] 2 All E.R. 955 (liability if S foresees the crime “as a real or serious risk”). Cf. 
Reardon [1999] Crim. L.R. 392 (contemplation of a “strong possibility” sufficient); Bryce [2004] EWCA Crim 
1231; [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 35 (p.592) (S need only contemplate a “real or substantial risk” of P’s crime). 
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complicity liability is enshrined in statute,
19
 so the reductionist move in Jogee is out of the question.
20
 
That was not the case in Australia’s uncodified jurisdictions. As it happens, the High Court considered 
Australian common law to be settled by the Court’s own well-established precedents.21 At the level of 
policy, however, the Court in Miller emphasised “the undesirability of altering the doctrine of 
extended joint criminal enterprise without examining the law with respect to secondary liability 
generally.”22  
 So there are two key questions here. First, as a matter of formal doctrine, how plausible is the 
claim that the common law knows only one actus reus channel to complicity liability? How deeply 
rooted in the case-law is (or in England was) the set of doctrines governing joint criminal enterprise 
liability? Secondly, to what extent does their abolition impoverish English law? Particularly in light of 
the forceful reassertion of basic aiding and abetting principles by the Supreme Court, can those 
principles adequately fill the vacuum—in terms of both actus reus and mens rea requirements—
created by abolishing joint criminal enterprise liability and, especially, its extended counterpart?  
 
 
II. ON THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
In terms of the actual reasoning in Jogee, the Supreme Court did not formally “abolish” joint criminal 
enterprise liability. Rather, it concluded that on the better view of the cases, such doctrines were by 
1984 no longer known to the law. The idea of common unlawful purpose as a separate ground of 
liability involves a “wrong turn”, a mistake (re)introduced into the law by the Privy Council in Chan 
Wing-Siu.
23
 As the Supreme Court accepted, common purpose doctrines existed prior to the 
nineteenth century. After that, however, “there was a significant change of approach”,24 and they 
disappeared. Reviewing the case law, the Court concluded that “the introduction of the principle [by 
Chan Wing-Siu in 1984] was based on an incomplete, and in some respects erroneous, reading of the 
previous case law, coupled with generalised and questionable policy arguments.”25 
 That verdict seems far too strong. This is not the place to undertake an extended trawl of the 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century cases.
26
 However, three main points may be made here.  
 First, for almost its entire history, the common law of crimes has known doctrines of common 
(unlawful) purpose. Leave aside the issue of extended joint criminal enterprises; we shall come to 
that. In terms of “plain vanilla” joint enterprises, it has never seriously been doubted that, if S and P 
come together with a common purpose to do crime A, S is liable for A when done by P, without proof 
that S assisted or encouraged P. Shared pursuit of the common purpose was in itself a form of 
criminal participation. Thus Hale observes that “if divers come to commit an unlawful act, and be 
present at the time of Felony committed, though one of them only doth it, they are all Principals.”27 
The same view is held by Foster.
28
 In part, the significance of presence was tied to the old distinction 
between principals in the second degree and accessories before the fact. But its significance did not 
vanish with the passing of section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, which was after all 
                                                     
19
 See, e.g., Criminal Code 1985 (Canada), s. 21(1) and (2); Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), s. 66(1) and (2); Penal Code 
1860 (India), ss. 34 and 107. 
20
 Cf. Cecilia Victoria Uhrle v The Queen [2016] NZSC 64. 
21
 Notably McAuliffe v The Queen [1995] HCA 37; (1995) 183 C.L.R. 108; Osland v The Queen [1998] HCA 
75; (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316; Gillard v The Queen [2003] HCA 64; (2003) 219 C.L.R. 1; Clayton v The Queen 
[2006] HCA 58, (2006) 81 A.L.J.R. 439; Huynh v The Queen [2013] HCA 6; (2013) 87 A.L.J.R. 434. 
22
 Miller, at [41]; a point made previously by the same Court in Clayton [2006] HCA 58; (2006) 81 A.L.J.R. 439 
at [19]. 
23
 [1985] A.C. 168. 
24
 Jogee, at [21]. 
25
 Jogee, at [79]. 
26
 Since drafting this essay, I have had the benefit of reading Findlay Stark’s considerable survey of the case law 
in “The Demise of ‘Parasitic Accessorial Liability’: Substantive Judicial Law Reform, Not Common Law 
Housekeeping” (2016) 75 C.L.J. 000. Stark concludes, persuasively, that Jogee’s claim to be merely 
“correcting” rather than substantively reforming the law should be rejected. 
27
 Pleas of the Crown (1678) 215. 
28
 Crown Law (1762) Discourse III, Ch. 1, esp. §§ 6, 9. 
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merely a procedural amendment.
29
 Thus, as late as 1964, J.W.C. Turner’s 12th edition of Russell on 
Crime treated presence pursuant to a common unlawful purpose as an alternate form of 
participation:
30
 
 
“if a special verdict against a man as a principal does not show that he did the act, or was 
present when it was done, or did some act at the time in aid which shows that he was present, 
aiding and abetting, or that he was of the same party, in the same pursuit, and under the same 
expectation of mutual defence and support with those who did the fact, the prisoner cannot be 
convicted.”  
 
So too Glanville Williams: “A person is guilty of aiding and abetting [i.e. as principal in the second 
degree] if he is either (a) a conspirator who is present at the time of the crime, whether or not he 
assists, or (b) anyone who knowingly assists or encourages at the time of the crime….”31 The key 
point here is that if S joins in a group criminal enterprise to commit a crime, it need not be shown that 
P received actual assistance or encouragement from S, or indeed (in the case of encouragement) that P 
was even aware of S. S’s liability for that crime arises from participation in the common unlawful 
purpose, not in a distinct act of aiding or abetting P.  
 This is entirely sensible. Of course a conspirator is, and should be, an accomplice when the 
agreed crime is ultimately perpetrated. S should be an accomplice in virtue of being party to the 
conspiracy. Once again, this is primarily an actus reus point. In practice, trial courts do not expect to 
see distinct evidence of assistance or encouragement in such cases; yet neither do they invoke any 
kind of deeming rule to bridge the logical gap between conspiracy and abetment.
32
 It is proof of the 
conspiracy itself that does the work.
33
  
 Admittedly, as noted earlier, the practical gap between “plain vanilla” joint enterprises and 
abetment is small. Most instances of a common purpose between S and P to commit crime A will 
support an inference of encouragement by S. Perhaps not all, though. A prosecutor put to prove 
abetment might struggle to do so when S joins a large group whose plans are already formed and 
where P is unaware of S’s actions. The Court in Jogee rightly observes that S’s encouragement need 
not make a difference.
34
 But that does not let the prosecution out of proving that it was received by P, 
nor that it was intended as encouragement; in particular, intended as encouragement of P. Debating 
niceties of this sort in the context of joint criminal enterprises seems to miss the point. It is more 
natural, and better aligned with the history, to embrace such enterprises as a form of participation per 
se. Refusal to do so will inevitably generate hard cases likely to be finessed with artificial reasoning. 
 
Extended joint criminal enterprise liability 
 
No amount of finessing could explain parasitic accessorial liability, of course. Here the analysis is 
more complex. According to the Supreme Court, extended joint enterprise liability may have been 
part of eighteenth century common law, but  
 
“cases in the 19th century show that there was a significant change of approach. It was no 
longer sufficient for the prosecution to prove that the principal’s conduct was a probable 
consequence, in the ordinary course of things, of the criminal enterprise instigated or agreed 
                                                     
29
 Cf. Jogee, at [6]. 
30
 J.W.C. Turner, Russell on Crime 12th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1964) 139. 
31
 Criminal Law: The General Part 2nd edn (London: Stevens & Sons, 1961) 353. 
32
 At one point ([78]), the Court suggests in Jogee that an agreement between S and P “is by its nature a form of 
encouragement.” This seems to be a pragmatic generalization rather than a proposed new rule of law. Moreover, 
one can join in a common purpose without forming an agreement as such with P—although, of course, the 
purpose must be shared rather than coincidental: cf. Petters and Parfitt [1995] Crim. L.R. 501.  
33
 Indeed, the same ought in principle to apply to conspirators “before the fact” as well as those present and 
pursuing the agreed crime: cf. Pinkerton v United States 328 U.S. 640, 66 S. Ct. 1180 (1946). Pinkerton is 
controversial in the U.S. because it confirms a strict liability extended-joint-enterprise rule for all conspirators 
(even when S is not present). But it is not controversial on the question of “plain vanilla” scenarios.  
34
 Jogee, at [12].  
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to by the secondary party. The prosecution had to prove that it was part of their common 
purpose, should the occasion arise.”35 
 
In Jogee, the Court purports to document the demise of extended liability for ancillary crimes. If we 
also accept the claim that there is only one actus reus channel to complicity liability, we reach the 
Court’s conclusion that S must directly aid or abet every crime of which S is convicted.  
 Numerous nineteenth- and even twentieth-century authorities do not support that conclusion. 
In the 1838 decision of Macklin and Murphy,
36
 for example, the traditional rule for extended joint 
criminal enterprises is restated in signal terms: “if several persons act together in pursuance of a 
common intent, every act done in furtherance of such intent by each of them is, in law, done by all.” It 
is worth emphasising that this is not even a rule of extended liability for probable consequences. It is 
a rule of strict liability, constrained only by the limitation that P must commit crime B in pursuance of 
the shared unlawful purpose. There is an interesting, and significant, distinction at work here. The 
older writers generally differentiated, albeit not without exception, between parasitical accessory 
liability for accessories before the fact—which extended to ancillary crimes by P that were probable 
consequences of the assisted or encouraged wrong
37—and parasitical accessory liability for principals 
in the second degree who, participating in the actual pursuit of crime A, were held strictly liable for 
crimes committed within the scope of that pursuit.
38
 Both rules were harsh, but they were not the same 
rules; indeed, the distinction between principals in the second degree and accessories used to be 
regarded as fundamental, so that an indictment as accessory before the fact to a crime was bad if the 
defendant was in fact present at the crime.
39
  
 Following enactment of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, the distinction between 
principals in the second degree and accessories before the fact became procedurally unimportant, and 
with it the substantive differences also started to break down.
40
 In particular, parasitic accessorial 
liability became restricted to contexts in which the parties were pursuing a common unlawful purpose. 
At the same time, statements of extended common purpose liability began to incorporate the 
objective, probability-based criterion formerly restricted to accessories before the fact.
41
 Meanwhile, 
running in parallel with this development was the rise of subjectivism. Expressions of a strict liability 
rule for crimes ancillary to a joint criminal enterprise are found well into the twentieth century, for 
instance in the 1943 case of Appleby,
42
 but it is fair to say that the mid-nineteenth century onwards 
saw the gradual evolution of a mens rea requirement. Across time, liability became restricted so as to 
exclude ancillary crimes that were not actually contemplated by S.
43
 
 However, this was merely a shift of the mens rea requirement for crime B, not an 
abandonment of the extensional structure. Strikingly, even this shift is not reflected in Russell on 
Crime until the 1958 edition, the second edited by J.W.C. Turner. The 9th edition, edited by Ross in 
1936, submitted “that the true rule of law is, that where several persons engage in the pursuit of a 
common unlawful object, and one of them does an act which the others ought to have known was not 
improbable to happen in the course of pursuing such common unlawful outcome, all are guilty.”44 The 
                                                     
35
 Jogee, at [21]. 
36
 (1838) 2 Lewin. 225; 168 E.R. 1136. 
37
 Cf. Foster, Crown Law (1762) Discourse III, Ch. 3, § 3; 1 Hale P.C. 436. 
38
 See, e.g. Plummer (1701) 12 Mod. 627 at 630, 88 E.R. 1565 at 1567 (Holt CJ), discussed in Foster, Crown 
Law (1762) Discourse III, Ch. 1, § 7; cf. 1 Hale P.C. 444. 
39
 Gordon (1789) 1 Leach 515; 1 East P.C. 352; Stewart (1818) Russ. & Ry. 363; 168 ER 846. 
40
 Witness the interesting disagreement between J.W.C. Turner (Russell on Crime 11th edn (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1958) 166-167) and Glanville Williams (Criminal Law: The General Part (London: Stevens & Sons, 
1953) 222) regarding the decision in Brown (1878) 14 Cox 144 that one who was present at a crime could not be 
convicted as an accessory before the fact. 
41
 S. Prentice, Russell on Crime 5th edn (London: Stevens, 1877) 164 (passage quoted in the text below). Cf. the 
Criminal Code (Indictable Offences) Bill of 1878, cl. 71; also colonial codes of the era, e.g. Criminal Code 1892 
(Canada), s. 61(2); Criminal Code Act 1893 (NZ), s. 73(2).  
42
 Appleby (1943) 28 Cr. App. R. 1 (C.C.A.); see also Betts and Ridley (1931) 22 Cr. App. R 148 (C.C.A.). 
43
 See, e.g., Betty (1963) 48 Cr. App. R. 6 at 10 (C.C.A.); Davies v DPP [1954] A.C. 378 at 401; [1954] 1 All 
E.R. 507 at 514 (H.L.).  
44
 R.E. Ross, Russell on Crime 9th edn (London: Stevens & Sons, 1936) 1481. 
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same phrasing, which originated in the 1877 edition, was continued by Turner for the 10th edition 
before being replaced by him with a subjective test of contemplation: “It is not essential that there 
should have been an agreement in express terms as to what the principal in the first degree should do; 
the aider and abettor will be responsible for anything done in the joint enterprise which the evidence 
shows was within his contemplation.”45 It is inconceivable that Turner, perhaps the leading academic 
criminal lawyer of the first half of the twentieth century, should have been so confused as to make this 
claim about a doctrine that had during the nineteenth century ceased to exist. The better view is that, 
by the time Turner wrote those lines, the doctrine had become modified, in terms of its mens rea 
requirements, but not abolished.  
 
The ‘scope’ of the common purpose 
 
Why was this not obvious? The problem lies in a hidden ambiguity. Let’s look again at the Court’s 
analysis: “It was no longer sufficient for the prosecution to prove that the principal’s conduct was a 
probable consequence, in the ordinary course of things, of the criminal enterprise instigated or agreed 
to by the secondary party. The prosecution had to prove that it was part of their common purpose, 
should the occasion arise.”46 But these are obviously not the same propositions. The conclusion that 
the law had drifted to a subjective, foresight-based test for extended joint criminal enterprise liability 
is not the same thing at all as a conclusion that extended joint criminal enterprise liability was no 
more; or that accessory liability—in 1950, let alone 1900—lay only if the “ancillary” crime was itself 
jointly intended. 
 This is not to suggest that the Court confused foresight with intention. As has been settled at 
least since Woollin,
47
 the two are not the same. Jogee confirms the distinction.
48
 Indeed, to hold 
otherwise would more or less restore us to our starting point, leaving us with extended joint criminal 
enterprise liability by another name. 
 What the Court did, though, was to elide a distinction between the shared purpose and the 
scope of the pursuit of that shared purpose. Specifically, the Supreme Court relied heavily upon a 
discussion of three cases that post-date Turner’s revision: Wesley Smith,49 Anderson and Morris,50 and 
Reid.
51
 But those cases do not establish the proposition the Court needs. Each of them turns on the 
issue of whether the principal’s conduct was foreseen or contemplated by the accomplice, not on 
whether it was intended. In Anderson and Morris, the trial judge had directed that S could be 
convicted “even though he had no idea that [P] had armed himself with a knife”;52 it was on this basis 
that S’s conviction was quashed. Wesley Smith is, if anything, even clearer:53 
 
“The grounds of appeal in this case although worded in different ways really, as I understand 
them, amount to the same thing; that is, that the use of a knife by [P] in this case was a 
departure, that is to say, assuming … that [S] was a party to some concerted action being 
taken against the barman, he certainly was not a party to the use upon the barman of a knife 
which resulted in the barman’s death. It is significant, as I have shown by reading Smith’s 
own statement, that he knew that Atkinson carried a knife. Indeed, I think he knew that one of 
the other man carried a cut-throat razor. It must have been clearly within the contemplation of 
a man like [S] who, to use one expression, had almost gone berserk himself to have left the 
public-house only to get bricks to tear up the joint, that if the bar tender did his duty to quell 
the disturbance and picked up the night stick, anyone whom he knew had a knife in his 
possession, like [P], might use it on the barman, as [P] did. By no stretch of imagination, in 
                                                     
45
 J.W.C. Turner, Russell on Crime 11th edn (London: Stevens & Sons, 1958) 152. 
46
 Jogee, at [21]. 
47
 [1999] 1 A.C. 82; [1998] 4 All E.R. 103 (HL). 
48
 Jogee, at [83], [87]. 
49
 [1963] 1 W.L.R. 1200; [1963] 3 All E.R. 597. 
50
 [1966] 2 Q.B. 110; [1966] 2 All E.R. 644. 
51
 (1976) 62 Cr. App. R. 109; [1976] Crim. L.R. 570. 
52
 [1966] 2 Q.B. 110 at 118E-F; see also at 120B-C. 
53
 [1963] 1 W.L.R. 1200 at 1206. 
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the opinion of this court, can that be said to be outside the scope of the concerted action in 
this case.” 
 
Neither, by any stretch of the imagination, can that be said to be their shared unlawful purpose. It is 
apparent from this passage that the Court understood a “departure” from the scope of the common 
purpose to involve an act going not merely beyond the core purpose shared by S and P but beyond 
activities contemplated as potential acts done in pursuit of that shared purpose. The scope of the 
common purpose is not the same as the core purpose itself, and the Court of Criminal Appeal 
understood that. Correspondingly, not everything that is within the scope of the shared or “common 
purpose” needs itself to be jointly intended or purposed. This point was seen too in Reid, where the 
trial judge’s direction “was unduly favourable to the accused as he did not say how far beyond the 
common design the odd man out would have to go to justify the acquittal of the others.”54 
 All this suggests that the Court in Chan Wing-Siu did not make a “wrong turn” at all in 1984. 
Admittedly, the Court of Appeal in Reid does suggest at one point that if death or serious injury “was 
not intended by [P’s companions], they must be acquitted of murder”; but nothing in the case turned 
on that statement, and the sentence continues: “having started out on an enterprise which envisaged 
some degree of violence, albeit nothing more than causing fright, they will be guilty of 
manslaughter.”55 Moreover, the equivocal language in this and other decisions hardly offers a basis 
for overturning, with little substantive engagement, a series of considered judgments by strong 
benches in the Privy Council,
56
 the House of Lords,
57
 and the Supreme Court,
58
 all of which 
confirmed that parties to a common unlawful enterprise are liable for foreseen crimes perpetrated in 
furtherance of that enterprise. 
 
 
III. FILLING THE VACUUM 
 
Be that as it may, common unlawful purpose doctrines are gone for now from English law. It seems 
inevitable that the legal requirements in the remaining secondary liability channel will in turn come 
under pressure. Indeed, the Court of Appeal has previously suggested that foresight of P’s possible 
crime may suffice to ground liability for aiding or abetting, using reasoning that drew explicitly upon 
joint enterprise case law.
59
 Perhaps needless to say, one important consideration behind arguments for 
preserving the separation of joint enterprise doctrines was to avert that risk.
60
  
 Against that backdrop, the reassertion in Jogee of traditional, intention- and knowledge-based 
mens rea requirements for aiding and abetting is very welcome. Suppose that S does something, 
otherwise lawful, that happens to help P commit a crime. If S foresees a risk of what P may do so, S 
may well be eligible for moral censure. But it is quite another thing to convict S of P’s crime. Lots of 
everyday things we do have the potential to encourage or facilitate crime. If the state wants to deter 
such conduct, it ought to do so by specific prohibitions, not by making ordinary people gamble with 
their criminal liability via generic complicity laws. A familiar example is the computer seller who 
facilitates music piracy. Similarly, if I leave my employer’s laptop on the seat of a friend’s car, aware 
that a known thief is operating in the neighbourhood, I may deserve reproach but I do not abet its 
theft; nor vandalism of the car. Respectable citizens like shopkeepers should not be obliged to stop 
trading, on pain of risking convictions, whenever they are aware that P may put what is purchased to 
criminal use. The same goes for the rest of us going about our everyday activities, whenever we 
realise there is a risk some miscreant will exploit what we do.
61
 Jogee reassures us that we don’t 
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always have to forego ordinary, law-abiding conduct just because there is a risk that others might 
misbehave. On the other hand, we do come under such obligations when practically sure what P will 
do: “the mental element in assisting or encouraging is an intention to assist or encourage the 
commission of the crime and this requires knowledge of any existing facts necessary for it to be 
criminal”.62 
 Granted, the criminal law has a general interest in stopping people from helping or 
encouraging others to commit crimes, even unintentionally. There is a trade-off here, between 
protecting potential victims and preserving the freedom of ordinary citizens whose activities are by 
themselves lawful. To convict S is, in effect, to confirm the prohibition of S’s conduct. Mens rea 
requirements play a crucial role in negotiating the scope of such prohibitions. In the case of citizens 
who do not themselves harm or wrong others, requiring knowledge of P’s actions narrows the scope of 
complicity prohibitions so as to allow them to live their lives without being impeded by fear of what P 
may do; the complicity-based prohibition is not of risking help or assistance, but of rendering it 
intentionally. 
 Neither is this to claim that it should always be permissible to take such risks, especially 
unreasonable risks, when facilitating or encouraging the conduct of others. But the prohibition of such 
risk-taking, where appropriate, should be effected by means of more specific offences and other forms 
of regulation such as licensing regimes. This is an area where the law needs to give otherwise law-
abiding citizens firmer and clearer guidance, without requiring them to make normative guesses about 
the legal risks involved in pursuing their own lives. Specific offences enable the state to do that.  
 
The mishandling of intention 
 
The merits of requiring knowledge when aiding or abetting are all very well, but does Jogee commit 
to them unequivocally? Perhaps not. Doctrinally speaking, the Supreme Court’s decision looks at first 
straightforward. The Court asserts that the essence of aiding and abetting is intentional assistance or 
encouragement. It follows on standard legal principles that S must intend his or her own contribution 
but need not intend P’s conduct. It is the assistance of the crime, not the ultimate crime itself, that 
must be intended by S.
63
 In turn, just as with attempts liability,
64
 an “intention” to do some action 
requires an intention with respect to the behavioural and consequential components of that action, but 
is generally satisfied by knowledge or settled belief (with no significant doubt) regarding the action’s 
circumstance elements.
65
 The same analysis applies here. It suffices to establish S’s intention to assist 
or encourage P’s crime if S intends his or her own contribution, being sure what P will do. From S’s 
perspective, the latter is a circumstance element. 
 Unfortunately, when the Court concludes by restating basic complicity principles,
66
 their 
Lordships’ handling of the mens rea requirement becomes insecure. Consider, first, the distinction 
between S’s intending to aid/abet and S’s desiring that P’s crime be committed. According to the 
Court,
67
 
 
“In cases of concerted physical attack there may often be no practical distinction to draw 
between an intention by D2 to assist D1 to act with the intention of causing grievous bodily 
harm at least and D2 having the intention himself that such harm be caused. … However, as a 
matter of law, it is enough that D2 intended to assist D1 to act with the requisite intent. That 
may well be the situation if the assistance or encouragement is rendered some time before the 
crime is committed and at a time when it is not clear what D1 may or may not decide to do. 
Another example might be where D2 supplies a weapon to D1, who has no lawful purpose in 
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having it, intending to help D1 by giving him the means to commit a crime (or one of a range 
of crimes), but having no further interest in what he does, or indeed whether he uses it at all.” 
 
But it is important to see that the case of joint attack is not analogous to the case of assistance or 
encouragement rendered “some time before the crime is committed”.  
 In establishing this, let us start with the latter type of case, of old-fashioned accessoryship 
before the fact. Suppose that S, a respectable builder, lends P a jemmy. S realises P that may use it to 
commit a burglary, but is uncertain whether P will, and (as the Supreme Court puts it) has no further 
interest in what P does. For the reasons summarised earlier, S ought not to be guilty of the burglary 
that P ultimately commits. 
 An intention/knowledge test bears this out. On both law and ordinary language, S lacks the 
intention to assist P’s burglary.68 Of course, if S has a further interest, and acts in order to assist P 
should P decide to commit the envisaged crime, that suffices to establish the requisite intention by S.
69
 
(In accordance with ordinary principles of direct intention, this holds even if S thinks it very unlikely 
that P will commit the crime.) Similarly, it generally suffices for S to know, in the sense of having no 
significant doubt, that P will commit one of a list of crimes.
70
 This is standard law since Nedrick and 
Woollin.
71
 But it is also where the law stops. In order to intend X, one must either act in order to bring 
X about or act knowing (i.e. being virtually certain) that one will bring X about. The same applies to 
aiding and abetting. In order to intend “to assist P to commit a burglary”, S must either act in order to 
assist P to commit a burglary (i.e. because for some reason S has an interest in P’s committing it), or 
act in the practical certainty that his or her conduct will assist P to commit a burglary. Will, not may.  
 Undoubtedly, the stringency of this standard will generate unattractive results. Hard cases 
often do. But consider the following example:
72
  
 
S illegally sells handguns. P buys a gun from S. He tells S that he will use the weapon to kill 
V, his partner, if V (despite being warned) continues to steal from their joint business. P says 
he is confident that V has given up his defalcations, so the need to kill V may not arise. S 
could not care less what P does with the gun and is interested only in the money she is paid 
for it. P later uses the gun to kill V. 
 
There are strong policy arguments in favour of holding S guilty of murdering V and not merely guilty 
of offences under gun control legislation. Surely, we might propose, it suffices that S knows P will be 
assisted by S’s conduct, if P ultimately does commit crime A? It does not. Many of those policy 
arguments are specific to the particular example. Once we leave them aside, subject to one important 
point to be considered below, the example is not significantly different from that of the computer sale, 
or indeed the laptop theft, both of which would satisfy our proposed test. Much of the normative 
power in the handgun scenario depends upon the fact that S’s conduct is already illegal (and 
reprehensible). But that feature can no longer make any legal difference to S’s liability. The only 
channel of complicity within which S’s liability ever turned on the legality of S’s own conduct was 
common unlawful purpose. Under the core doctrines of assistance/encouragement, it has never been 
relevant whether S’s conduct was independently illegal.  
 Change the guns, then, to baseball bats. Obviously we don’t want to shut down sports goods 
vendors.  Suppose, once more, that P tells S why he is buying the bat (“just in case”). Is it criminal 
complicity for S to sell P the bat?  
                                                     
68
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 As the passage quoted earlier in this section suggests, the Supreme Court thinks it is. The 
Court can only be right about that if we can truly say that S intends to assist P’s killing of V. Again, 
however, Nedrick and Woollin stand in the way. S does not act in order to assist P to kill. Neither does 
S act in the practical certainty that P will use the bat to kill.  
 
The mishandling of conditional intention 
 
The Court obscures this difficulty by its repeated assertion that S’s intention “may be conditional”.73 
But in the baseball bat example, S has no conditional intention. It is P whose intention is conditional. 
Admittedly, this example presents a special case. S knows that the bat will be used to kill given a 
certain contingency. This makes it a stronger case for criminalisation than the computer sale or laptop 
theft examples. Perhaps the normal mens rea requirements for aiding and abetting should be 
supplemented to accommodate liability for this kind of “contingent knowledge” case. (Although it is 
hard to see how to do so without criminalising the computer seller or the lazy laptop leaver, unless we 
introduce a new set of highly technical and practically unworkable mens rea distinctions.) Either way, 
however, we should not pretend that this case, special though it be, meets the definition of intending, 
conditionally or otherwise, to assist a killing.  
 Crucially, this objection can be generalised to virtually all cases of assistance or 
encouragement “rendered some time before the crime is committed and at a time when it is not clear 
what D1 may or may not decide to do.” 74 Talk of conditional intention in this context is a red herring. 
Once S’s help or encouragement is rendered, there can be no question of S having a conditional 
intention. S’s part is done. Any conditional intention to do something requires that the thing to be 
done lies in the future. For prior aiding and abetting, it is therefore essential that, at the time of S’s 
own actions, S already holds the crystallised, unconditional intention to assist or encourage the very 
crime (perhaps among others) that P ultimately commits. 
 It may be helpful to elaborate upon this point. A conditional intention is a species of future 
intention, in the sense that one holds a conditional intention to do X when one holds an intention to do 
X should the relevant condition be met at some time in the future. Such an intention imports two key 
constraints. First, X must lie in the future, in that one is not yet actually doing X, although that 
moment may be close at hand. Secondly, whatever else it relates to, S’s intention must also relate to 
an action by S. Someone who opens the back door of a lorry intending to steal the contents should 
they be valuable still has an action to do (i.e., steal the contents). Hence they can have a conditional 
intention to steal the contents at the point when they open the door.  
 But when there is an act of aiding or abetting, S has nothing left to do. What lies in the future 
is P’s action. And that action is up to P, not S. Save in special cases of causing or procuring, S cannot 
intend that P will do X. S can of course act in order to help or encourage P to do X: S can intend his 
or her own act of helping or encouraging P’s action. But S can’t intend P’s action. Neither can S 
intend P’s mens rea.75 And so S can’t conditionally intend them either.  
 None of this is to deny the possibility of conditionally intending to help another. However, 
that would be a case where S has not yet rendered help, and means to do so only if some further 
condition is met (e.g. if P pays the agreed fee, or turns out to be a friend, etc.). In such a case, the 
actus reus of S’s aiding has not yet occurred, so participation cannot be established. By contrast, once 
the help is rendered—the gun is passed to P—that help is either intended or not. It cannot be 
conditionally intended: it is done. Of course, there are still conditions to be met before we can say that 
S did actually aid P to do X. Notably, P must go on to do X. But that is an actus reus condition, not a 
mens rea one.  
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 Part of the difficulty with the Court’s restatement is a lack of precision. Aiding or abetting 
liability requires that, at the time S does the helpful or encouraging act, S intends (either directly or as 
a foreseen virtual certainty) to help or encourage P by that act. Failure to observe this requirement 
allows the court to state, for example, that
76
  
 
“If [S] joins with a group which he realises is out to cause serious injury, the jury may well 
infer that he intended to encourage or assist the deliberate infliction of serious bodily injury 
and/or intended that that should happen if necessary. In that case, if [P] acts with intent to 
cause serious bodily injury and death results, [P] and [S] will each be guilty of murder.”  
 
Yet this passage succeeds only if S’s joining with the group was itself an act of encouraging P to 
commit GBH and was intended as such at that time. In most of the harder cases, such convenient 
findings seem unlikely. Moreover, where those findings are unavailable, the act of joining the group 
drops out of the picture. In terms of aiding and abetting doctrine, it is legally irrelevant. Some later act 
of intentionally (and actually) encouraging or helping P to commit GBH must be found.  
 
Escalation and the importance of presence 
 
Or perhaps such a case could be manslaughter? So the Supreme Court affirms:
77
 
 
“If a person is a party to a violent attack on another, without an intent to assist in the causing 
of death or really serious harm, but the violence escalates and results in death, he will be not 
guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.”  
 
It is hard to see why this conclusion follows under the law of aiding and abetting. Suppose that S joins 
an enterprise to commit an assault. In joining it, let’s concede, S encourages P to commit the assault. 
(That would of course need to be proved.) P, however, goes on to commit murder by deliberately 
inflicting serious injuries that cause death. How is it the case that S has intentionally encouraged that 
act? It is true, as the Court notices, that murder and manslaughter are constructive crimes. But that 
truth does not permit us to bypass the requirement that secondary parties must have encouraged the 
(type of) act that caused death, and that they must have done so intentionally. Of course, one might 
argue that an unlawful and dangerous act, sufficient for manslaughter, was included in the greater act 
of inflicting GBH. But that lesser act did not cause death.  
 The Supreme Court’s affirmation to the contrary offers us reassurance: while the abolition of 
parasitic accessorial liability may make murder verdicts harder to obtain in the context of group 
violence, we need not be unduly concerned because manslaughter verdicts will always be available as 
a fallback. The only exception to that, according to the Court, will be where P’s lethal action 
constitutes an “overwhelming supervening event”, of the kind recognised in Anderson and Morris.78 
But in truth, Anderson and Morris is a fairly typical escalation case.
79
 The gap between what S 
assumed P would do and what P actually did will consistently, not exceptionally, be at the heart of 
trial arguments about what kind of act S intended to encourage or assist. If, following escalation, 
death was not caused by an act of the same type that S meant to encourage, a manslaughter verdict 
will be unavailable on aiding/abetting principles. 
 Alternatively, the prosecution may allege an intentional act of encouragement that occurs 
after the violence has “escalated”. But then, as we noted earlier, everything that went before—being 
“party to a violent attack on another”—is legally irrelevant. It is mere historical setting. It is irrelevant 
to aiding and abetting doctrines because those doctrines are fundamentally static. In accordance with 
standard concurrence principles, they are tied to a particular act, done at a moment in time when S 
also has the requisite mens rea. If prior embarkation on a common purpose is doing any work in the 
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post-escalation scenario, then that approach fails; and with it the restatement of principles in Jogee. 
This failure is merely concealed by an obfuscatory reference to conditional intentions.  
 Under common purpose doctrines, of course, there is no need to show a fresh act of aid or 
abetment, because the common purpose is itself legally significant. Common purpose doctrine is 
capable of accommodating dynamic scenarios, given the continuing nature of the shared purpose and 
its pursuit by S and P. Since S’s involvement in the common purpose is ongoing, unlike aiding and 
abetting it can be meaningful to talk of a conditional intention: indeed, the Court’s appeal to 
conditional intention works only if we distinguish between common purpose and aiding/abetting. The 
normative significance of ongoing presence in a joint criminal enterprise also explains why the 
requirements for withdrawal from a common purpose differed historically: S needed simply to 
disengage unequivocally from the shared purpose, whereas aid or encouragement must in principle be 
countermanded.
80
  
 
 
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS, IN-PRINCIPLE AND INSTITUTIONAL 
 
The English Court of Appeal faces some headaches. A claim that Jogee is truer to the pre-1984 
history is unpersuasive. Assuredly, the Privy Council, House of Lords, and Supreme Court decisions 
in Chan Wing-Siu,
81
 Hui Chi-Ming,
82
 Powell,
83
 Rahman,
84
 and Gnango
85
 have been overturned in 
substance. In some ways, acknowledging that would help to reaffirm the legitimacy of convictions 
between 1984 and 2016, since it would imply those convictions were not grounded in misapplied law. 
(Neither would the view that common unlawful purpose liability was abolished in 2016 raise 
problems of retrospective criminalisation.) Unfortunately, the Court in Jogee did not refer to the 1966 
Practice Statement,
86
 nor constitute a larger bench. So the earlier summative court decisions are not 
formally overruled. In principle, Jogee sits alongside them.  
 Why, then, prefer Jogee? Disruptive the decision may be, but as both the High Court of 
Australia and the Supreme Court recognised,
87
 institutional considerations should not take precedence 
over profound injustice.  
 There are no simple solutions in the field of complicity law. The problems are complex and 
nuanced. Rational arguments can be made both for and against the merits of extended joint criminal 
enterprise liability. Those arguments are not knock-down ones, and it is not helpful to suggest 
otherwise. The High Court, while embracing the grip of precedent, addressed those arguments 
somewhat indirectly. Endorsing the earlier discussion in Powell,
88
 the Court pointed to evidential 
difficulties associated with group wrongdoing, as well as to its inherent dangerousness and tendency 
to escalate. Miller also acknowledges the distinctive normative character of the wrong involved in 
embarking on a joint criminal enterprise.
89
  
 On the other hand, the Supreme Court made virtually no effort to argue against joint 
enterprise liability at the level of principle. It merely pointed to the so-called “anomaly” of requiring a 
“lower” mens rea standard for S than for P.90 But the mens rea standard isn’t lower. It is different. As 
the well-known case of Callow v Tillstone illustrates,
91
 sometimes S’s mens rea can be far more 
stringent than is demanded of P. Given that actus reus requirements differ between accessories and 
                                                     
80
 This point is not noticed in the Court’s discussion of Hyde (1672): see Jogee, at [13]. 
81
 [1985] A.C. 168. 
82
 Hui Chi-Ming v R. [1992] 1 A.C. 34. 
83
 Powell; English [1999] 1 A.C. 1. 
84
 [2008] UKHL 45; [2009] 1 A.C. 129. 
85
 [2011] UKSC 59; [2012] 1 A.C. 827. 
86
 See Austin v Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Southwark [201] UKSC 28; [2011] 1 A.C. 355 
at [24]–[25]. 
87
 Miller, at [39]; Jogee, at [79ff]. 
88
 [1999] 1 A.C. 1 at 14; see Miller, at [36]. 
89
 Miller, at [34].  
90
 Jogee, at [84]. Cf. Gageler J’s dissent in Miller, at [111] and [120]; also the response by Keane J (concurring 
with the majority) at [140]–[141]. 
91
 (1900) 64 J.P. 823. 
13 
 
principals, it is hardly surprising that the mens rea elements also differ. S needs to intend his or her 
own act of involvement, and have mens rea regarding P’s acts as well as regarding P’s mens rea. 
More generally, it is a mistake to think that S’s culpability must equal P’s. What matters is whether S 
is sufficiently culpable to be held guilty of P’s crime.  
 Still, there is the broader worry that extended joint criminal enterprise law may be Draconian 
in practice. Curiously, the law in jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand has not 
generated parallel controversy to that in England. The High Court in Miller was not presented with 
evidence that it has become a state weapon of systematic injustice.
92
 Albeit without citing any such 
evidence, the Supreme Court saw things differently. The decision in Jogee is clearly informed by a 
sense that the application of extended joint criminal enterprise liability rules has in recent years 
produced significant injustice. 
 Given the lack of analysis of this problem, it is plausible that the difficulty may arise not from 
common purpose liability doctrine per se but from how it has been applied: from over-zealous 
findings of shared criminal purposes—with foresight—against those on the periphery of wrongdoing. 
Common purpose liability should be a form of guilt by enterprise, not by association; a point 
emphasised forcefully by the High Court in Miller.
93
 If extended joint criminal enterprise doctrines 
have indeed been abused, or indeed are prone to abuse, that certainly supplies a reason to see them 
off. But one should always hesitate before casting out the baby with the bathwater. Extended joint 
criminal enterprise doctrines could instead have been tweaked to avoid overreach,
94
 for instance by 
tightening the definition of joint enterprises and, perhaps, by requiring that S foresaw P’s further 
crime as probable;
95
 or by limiting convictions to cases where S was certain that the collateral offence 
would be committed by P in the event of particular, foreseen circumstances. Such revisions would, of 
course, depart from existing case law,
96
 but not to the radical extent that Jogee does. 
 Alas, once joint enterprise liability was castigated as an egregious error in law, it had to go. 
The Supreme Court backed itself into a corner. That is unfortunate because it meant the Court never 
took seriously the question whether common unlawful purpose should have legal significance. In 
principle, having two distinct channels of complicity liability affords the law greater flexibility and 
moral sensitivity when determining whether S is a participant in P’s crime. Direct aiding/abetting 
doctrines are simply too blunt by themselves to capture, without substantial over- or under-inclusion, 
all forms of association with P’s crime that warrant a finding of guilt alongside P.  
 Despite the attention lavished upon them, the key features of common unlawful purpose 
liability are not its mens rea elements. They are (i) a distinctive actus reus, i.e. joining in a common 
purpose, which cannot simply be reduced to assistance or encouragement; (ii) the unlawfulness of that 
actus reus in its own right; and (iii) S’s presence in the pursuance of their common purpose. By 
collapsing common purpose liability into mere aiding/abetting, the law obviates—and so loses sight 
of—these crucial features, which are not shared by acts of aiding/abetting. Lending P a jemmy is not 
anti-social at all until we know that P’s plans for its use are wrongful.97 Setting out with P on a 
criminal enterprise is entirely a different matter. 
 The High Court of Australia was right to point to the discussion of merits in Powell. As Lord 
Steyn observed in that case,
98
 joint criminal enterprises are dynamic and often escalate. Unlike 
aiding/abetting scenarios, S signs up to that dynamic character on an ongoing basis. As such, common 
unlawful purpose doctrine responds to contingencies of scope, rather than contingencies of S’s 
intention. It allows the common law to accommodate fast-moving developments, provided they occur 
in the pursuance and within the foreseen scope of the criminal enterprise (in which S has a non-
contingent intention to engage), and in the presence of S. Moreover, as Lord Steyn also noted, the 
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doctrine allows the courts to overcome at least some of the traditional evidential difficulties associated 
with group wrongdoing.  
 The Court in Jogee overestimates the capacity of aiding/abetting law to accommodate such 
difficulties. Joint criminal enterprises are a distinct moral phenomenon. Indeed, only by recognising 
that can we adequately protect the law of aiding and abetting. Absent legislative reform, the 
inadequacy of traditional aiding/abetting doctrine to deal with the complexity of multi-party 
wrongdoing will inevitably generate pressure, either to restore joint criminal enterprise liability or—
disastrously—to water down the mens rea requirements of aiding and abetting itself. Let us hope that 
London opts for the former, and ultimately realigns itself with Canberra. 
 
A.P. Simester.
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